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European Central Bank working paper series 55Abstract
This paper employs individual bidding data to analyze the empirical perfor-
mance of the longer term reﬁnancing operations (LTROs) of the European Central
Bank (ECB). We investigate how banks’ bidding behavior is related to a series
of exogenous variables such as collateral costs, interest rate expectations, mar-
ket volatility and to individual bank characteristics like country of origin, size,
and experience. Panel regressions reveal that a bank’s bidding depends on bank
characteristics. Yet, diﬀerent bidding behavior generally does not translate into
diﬀerences concerning bidder success. In contrast to the ECB’s main reﬁnancing
operations, we ﬁnd evidence for the winner’s curse eﬀect in LTROs. Our results
indicate that LTROs do neither lead to market distortions nor to unfair auction
outcomes.
Keywords: Monetary Policy Instruments of the ECB, Auctions, Winner’s Curse,
Panel Analysis of Bidding Behavior
JEL classiﬁcation: E52, D44
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Repo auctions are the predominant instrument for the implementation of monetary
policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). Repo rates govern short-term interest
rates and the availability of repo credit determines the liquidity of the European bank-
ing sector. The ECB conducts repo auctions as weekly main reﬁnancing operations
(MRO) with a (bi)weekly maturity and as monthly longer term reﬁnancing operations
(LTRO) maturing after three months. Although MROs are the ECB’s primary policy
instrument, LTROs are far from negligible. In 2003, reﬁnancing via LTROs amounts
to 45 bln Euro which is about 20% of overall liquidity provided by the ECB. This
paper analyzes banks’ bidding behavior in LTROs to shed more light on the deter-
minants of banks’ reserve management and the role of LTROs within the monetary
policy framework of the ECB.
The analysis of banks’ bidding behavior provided strong evidence for the winner’s curse
eﬀect in LTROs. In line with theoretical predictions, banks reduce their participation,
bid at lower interest rates, and reduce their bid volume as interest rate uncertainty
increases. Interestingly, large banks react stronger to rate uncertainty than small
banks. This indicates that large banks are particulary interested in the common value
component of the longer term reﬁnancing since they have on average a more active
interbank money market desk. The ﬁnding of a winner’s curse eﬀect in LTROs is in
marked contrast to the evidence from the ECB’s main reﬁnancing operations. This
suggests that the private value component of repos is more pronounced in MROs than
in LTROs where common money market conditions seem to be more important for
banks’ bidding behavior.
One of the original intentions of the ECB when establishing LTROs was to give smaller
banks with only limited access to the interbank market a comfortable source of longer
term reﬁnancing. In terms of their total share in reﬁnancing, LTROs are more impor-
tant for smaller and medium size banks than for large banks. However, our results
do not substantiate the notion that LTROs are especially designed for and used by
smaller banks.
An important requirement for its reﬁnancing operations is that the auction procedure
does not violate the principle of equal treatment. In particular, certain types of
banks should not bid a priori more successfully in LTROs than others. Although
we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the bidding behavior across banks of diﬀerent size
and from diﬀerent countries, the resulting diﬀerences in terms of bidding success were
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cost showed that diﬀerent bidding strategies in most cases do not imply an obvious
ranking of banks in terms of bidding success. For example, small banks realize higher
cover to bid ratios in LTROs than medium and large banks but also tend to have
higher reﬁnancing cost.
While the preannounced minimum bid rate is an important feature of the ECB’s
MROs, LTROs are conducted as pure variable rate tenders. One might expect that
without the guidance of a minimum bid rate, bidding in LTRO auctions would be
particularly diﬃcult. In fact, in contrast to MROs where most banks place their
whole bid volume at a single interest rate, banks typically submit several bids in
LTROs. Yet, the weighted standard deviation of bid rates in LTROs is only one basis
point which is very close to the bid rate dispersion observed in MROs. Moreover, there
is no indication that a pure variable rate tender induces banks to bid on a large scale
deliberately belowthe market consensus. We also found that experienced bidders are
not signiﬁcantly more successful in LTROs than less experienced ones.
Overall, this study demonstrated that the longer term repo auctions of the European
Central Bank do neither lead to market distortions nor to unfair auction outcomes.
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Repo auctions are the predominant instrument for the implementation of monetary
policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). Repo rates govern short-term interest
rates and the availability of repo credit determines the liquidity of the European bank-
ing sector. The ECBconducts repo auctions as weekly main reﬁnancing operations
(MRO) with a biweekly maturity and as monthly longer term reﬁnancing operations
(LTRO) maturing after three months. Although MROs are the ECB’s primary policy
instrument, LTROs are far from negligible. In 2003, reﬁnancing via LTROs amounts
to 45 bln Euro which is about 20% of overall liquidity provided by the ECB. Using
individual bidding data, this paper studies the role of LTROs in banks’ reserve man-
agement to shed more light on the relevance of LTROs within the monetary policy
framework of the ECB.
Longer term reﬁnancing should be particularly attractive to banks with a less active
reserve management. In fact, one motivation of the ECBto establish LTROs was to
give ”a good opportunity for smaller banks which have limited or no access to the
interbank market to receive liquidity for a longer period”, see ECB(2002b). In order
to investigate whether LTROs are indeed a more important reﬁnancing tool for small
banks, we explore how a bank’s bidding behavior depends on its size. In particular, we
examine how a bidder’s size aﬀects the response to changing money market conditions.
The principle of equal treatment is an important criteria of assessing the empirical
performance of LTROs. Speciﬁcally, a bank’s size or its country of origin should
not have a severe impact on bidding success. Therefore, we investigate how bidder
behavior depends on various bidder characteristics. Advancing on previous studies
on Treasury bill and central bank auctions (e.g. Nyborg, Rydqvist and Sundaresan,
2002, Nyborg, Bindseil and Strebulaev, 2002 and Linzert, Nautz and Breitung, 2003),
we not only infer on the basis of actual bidding behavior but also look at individual
cover to bid ratios as well as relative reﬁnancing cost as complementary measures of
bidding success.
In the course of evaluating its operational framework via a public consultation of banks
in Fall 2002, the ECBproposed to suspend LTROs ”for the sake of a lean implemen-
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in favor of LTROs to be able to diversify the maturity of their liabilities and ”to ob-
tain liquidity during times of general market tensions or when faced with individual
liquidity problems”, see ECB(2003b). In order to explore the role of LTROs in banks’
reserve management, we investigate the relation between bidder behavior in LTROs
and MROs. In particular, we analyze whether the auction outcome of an MRO aﬀects
bidding in LTROs, and whether frequent bidders in MROs tend to be also active in
LTROs.
Similar to e.g. Treasury bill auctions but in contrast to the ECB’s main reﬁnancing
operations, LTROs are conducted in a pure variable rate tender format, i.e. without
minimum bid rate. One concern about auctions without minimum bid rate is that
there is no guidance for less informed and less sophisticated bidders. The LTRO
auction format should be simple enough so that LTROs are equally accessible to all
banks. Therefore, we will also look at the performance of experienced relative to less
experienced bidders.
In common value auctions bidders are exposed to winner’s curse implying that they
should bid more cautious when interest rate uncertainty rises. In fact, this eﬀect is
well documented for Treasury bill auctions, see e.g. Nyborg, Rydqvist and Sundare-
san (2002) and Bjonnes (2001). Yet, Nyborg, Bindseil and Strebulaev (2002) found
only mixed evidence in favor of the winner’s curse eﬀect in the ECB’s MROs. In the
Eurosystem, the demand for reserves in MROs might be more closely related to the
banks’ private liquidity needs than in LTROs and could thus be less dependent to com-
mon market conditions. In this case, the winner’s curse eﬀect should be particularly
relevant for bidders in LTROs.
Our analysis is based on a data set of 50 LTRO auctions conducted between March
1999 and May 2003. Unique bidder codes allow to follow bidding behavior of individ-
ual banks over time and to apply panel econometric techniques. A panel probit model
will provide insights into a bank’s participation decision. Moreover, banks’ bidding be-
havior is analyzed in more detail by studying the individual bid amount, the weighted
average bid rate and the bid rate dispersion. In particular, we will investigate how
collateral costs, interest rate expectations, and interest rate uncertainty aﬀects bid-
ding in LTROs. Bidding variables, like the bid amount, can only be observed if a bank
8
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we explicitly account for the censoring problem of the bidding behavior variables.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, we ﬁnd that bidder behavior is
inﬂuenced by a bank’s size and its country of origin. However, diﬀerences in bidders’
response to various exogenous variables do not necessarily imply that banks bid with
diﬀerent success. In particular, banks with lower reﬁnancing cost must realize lower
cover to bid ratios and vice versa. Thus, diﬀerent bidding strategies in LTROs seem
to reﬂect diﬀerent attitudes towards the risk of going out empty handed. Second,
banks’ bidding in MROs and LTROs must not be seen as independent. For example,
there are signiﬁcant spill over eﬀects from MROs to LTROs, i.e. banks use LTROs
to adjust the liquidity position from MROs. Third, we found that in LTROs bidder
experience is not an important issue with respect to a bank’s success. Fourth, there
is no evidence that the pure variable rate tender applied in LTROs induces banks
to bid at unrealistically low interest rates. In particular, the bid rate dispersion in
LTROs is almost the same as in MROs. Fifth, in contrast to the ﬁndings from MROs,
there is clear evidence for the winner’s curse eﬀect in LTROs. In line with auction
theory, banks’ participation, the bid volume and the bid rate decrease when interest
rate uncertainty rises.
The rest of the paper will proceed as follows. The next section describes the role of
LTROs in the operational framework of the ECBand the institutional background.
Some descriptive statistics on bidder behavior and performance are given in Section 3.
Section 4 introduces the variables that enter our panel regressions and discusses how
those might aﬀect bidding behavior. The empirical results on banks’ participation
decision and their bidding behavior in terms of bid volume, bid rate and bid rate
dispersion are given in Section 5. In particular, we estimate how a bank’s reaction
towards changes in collateral costs, interest rate expectations and uncertainty depends
on its size and country of origin. That section also presents our results concerning
banks’ bidding success. Section 6 summarizes the main results and oﬀers some policy
conclusions.
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of the ECB
The role of MROs and LTROs in the ECB’s operational framework for monetary policy
diﬀers in two main respects. First, due to their higher frequency and their shorter
maturity, MROs are designed to actively steer the liquidity of the banking sector. In
particular, the repo volume allotted via MROs is not predetermined by the ECBbut
responds to liquidity shocks and possibly to the bids of the banks. By contrast, the
allotment volumes of LTROs are changed only infrequently and are always ﬁxed at the
auction’s outset. Therefore, LTROs are not used to steer money market conditions but
provide banks with ”additional longer-term reﬁnancing”, i.e. a basis stock of reserves
that is unrelated to any short-term liquidity ﬂuctuations, see ECB(2000).
The second crucial diﬀerence between MROs and LTROs concerns the inﬂuence of
the ECBon the interest rate. MROs play the dominant role in steering short term
interest rates. The MRO rate serves as the ECB’s key interest rate which is either
explicitly set by the ECB(if it is conducted as ﬁxed rate tender) or (in case of a
variable rate tender) at least restricted by a pre-announced minimum bid rate. By
contrast, LTROs are always conducted as pure variable rate tenders, i.e. without a
minimum bid rate. The ECBsimply accepts the allotment rates resulting from its
pre-announced supply of liquidity and the demand for LTROs submitted by the banks.
Acting as a price-taker, the ECBcannot use LTROs for signaling intended interest
rate levels.1
Apart from the omitted minimum bid rate and the pre-announced allotment volume,
the rules of LTROs and MROs are identical. Each bank can submit bids at up to
ten diﬀerent bid rates at the precision of one basis point (0.01%). Furthermore, both
auctions are price-discriminating, i.e. every successful bidder has to pay its bid. In
both auctions, banks need to deposit eligible collateral with the Eurosystem to cover
the amounts allotted.
1 In fact, banks realized that LTROs convey no relevant information about the future stance of
monetary policy. Regressing the change of the three-month Euribor on the aggregate auction data
published by the ECB (i.e. on the bid to cover ratio, the marginal rate, the bid rate dispersion etc.)
one can show that results of LTROs do not aﬀect interest rates of the interbank money market.
These results are not reported in this paper but can be obtained from the authors on request.
10
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 359
May 2004What is the ’optimal’ share of LTROs in the total liquidity provision of the ECB?
On the one hand, the share of LTROs must not be too large in order to leave enough
room for manoeuvre in steering the liquidity supply through MROs. In practice, the
ECBtherefore provides the major part of reserves through MROs but LTROs are still
important. Since June 2000 the share of LTROs in the total liquidity provision is
between 20% and 25%. Yet one may even argue that LTROs are superﬂuous for an
eﬃcient liquidity management and should be abandoned in order to increase the trans-
parency and simplicity of the ECB’s operational framework, see e.g. ECB (2002b).
On the other hand, if LTROs allow the banks to improve the eﬃciency of their liq-
uidity management without introducing market distortions, then the importance of
LTROs might even increase, not decrease.
3 Descriptive Statistics on LTRO Bidding Data
3.1 A First Look at the Data
The Sample
Our data set consists of individual bidding data of all regular reﬁnancing operations
(MROs and LTROs) conducted by the ECBfrom March 1999 to May 2003. 2 The
focus of our analysis is on the performance of the 50 LTROs executed in this period.
6776 credit institutions in the euro area fulﬁlled the general conditions to participate
in the ECB’s regular reﬁnancing operations but a lot of banks refrained from bidding
irrespectively of the prevailing situation in the money market. We therefore restrict
our attention to those 1809 banks that participated at least once in either a MRO or
aL T R O .
Number of Bidders
From March 1999 to May 2003, the average number of bidders in LTROs has been
232. However, similar to the trend observed in the MROs the number of bidders in
2 In January and February 1999 LTROs were performed as Dutch auctions in which every successful
bidder pays the marginal rate.
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Notes: The number of bidders shown in the Figure refers to LTROs conducted from
March 1999 until May 2003.
LTROs declines over time, see Figure 1 and Nyborg, Bindseil and Strebulaev (2002).3
In both types of reﬁnancing operations, the number of bidders dropped to almost 50%
of the initial number in 1999. Therefore, the driving factors of the decreasing number
of bidders are not LTRO speciﬁc. Possible explanations for the declining trend in both
open market operations are the ongoing process of concentration and rationalization
in the banking sector and the higher eﬃciency of the interbank market. In particular,
the centralization of open market operations in the headquarters of a particular bank
makes bidding by the individual branches obsolete.
Banks’Participation
Figure 2 shows the frequency of participation in LTROs, i.e. in how many auctions a
bank participated over the sample period. From the 1809 banks under consideration,
1003 banks bid in at least one LTRO but many banks participated on a very infrequent
basis. For example, 195 banks placed bids only once while only four banks bid in all
50 LTROs.
3 Note that this downward trend is not size-speciﬁc. According to Figure 12 in Appendix, the number
of bidders drops for small, medium and as well as for large bidders.
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Notes: The Figure displays the number of banks that participated in a particular number
of auctions over the course of all 50 auctions under consideration from March 1999 to
May 2003. For example, 806 banks participated in none of the 50 auctions from March
1999 to May 2003.
Total Bids and Allotments
Figure 3 depicts the total bid volume submitted in the LTROs and the total allotment
amount. According to the role of LTROs in the ECB’s operational framework, the
allotment volume changed only a few times and was always either 15, 20 or 25 bln
Euro. The total bid volume is on average around 46 bln Euro. In line with the
decreasing number of bidders, the total bid volume is higher in the ﬁrst part of the
sample but the declining trend gets less pronounced since June 2000. There is one
occasion where total bids drop almost to the level of the preannounced allotment
volume.
Number of Bids
Figure 4 displays the distribution of the number of bids by bank. In contrast to MROs,
where many banks place their whole bid volume at a single interest rate, banks typi-
cally submit several bids in LTROs. The average number of bids per bank in a LTRO
13
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Notes: The total bid volume and the total allotment by the ECB shown in the Figure
refers to all LTROs that have been conducted in the sample period from March 1999
until May 2003. After a reduction in autonomous factors, the ECB lowered the allotment
volume from 20 to 15 billion Euros in July 2002.
is close to 4 while bank submit on average 2.4 bids in MRO auctions, see Nyborg,
Bindseil and Strebulaev (2002). One immediate explanation for the higher number
of bids in LTRO auctions is the absence of the minimum bid rate that constrains
bidders in the MROs. The minimum bid rate also explains why the distribution of
the number of bids submitted in MROs is strongly skewed, see Nyborg, Bindseil and
Strebulaev (2002). In contrast, the LTRO bid distribution only slightly skewed to the
right, compare Figure 4.
Bid Rate Dispersion
More information about the bidding strategies of banks is revealed in the variable bid
rate dispersion deﬁned as the quantity weighted standard deviation of a bank’s bid
rates. Figure 5 shows for each LTRO the (unweighted) average of all bank speciﬁc bid
rate dispersions. The evolution of the average bid rate dispersion shows that banks
place their bids in a range of 2-3 basis points. Remarkable exceptions are the three
tenders prior to the turn of the century at the end of 1999 where the bid rate dispersion
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Figure 5: The Aggregate Bid Rate Dispersion
.
0
0
5
.
0
1
.
0
1
5
.
0
2
.
0
2
5
.
0
3
B
i
d
 
R
a
t
e
 
D
i
s
p
e
r
s
i
o
n
0 10 20 30 40 50
Auction
Bid Rate Dispersion
Notes: The aggregate bid rate dispersion is an unweighted average of all individual bid
rate dispersions and is displayed over all LTROs in the sample period from March 1999
until May 2003.
15
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 359
May 2004Figure 6: LTRO Rates and 3-Month Repo Rate
2
3
4
5
6
R
a
t
e
s
0 10 20 30 40 50
Auction
LTRO Rate Min LTRO Rate
Max LTRO Rate 3−M Repo
LTRO Rates and 3−M Repo Rate
Notes: The LTRO rate displayed refers to the marginal rate of the corresponding tender.
The minimum and maximum LTRO rate are the minimum and maximum bid rate of an
individual bank, respectively. The 3-month Repo is taken from the day of the deadline
for counterparties’ submission of bids. The rates are displayed from March 1999 to May
2003.
sharply increases. One might have expected that the pure variable rate tender format
of the LTROs induces bidders to bid permanently on a wide range of interest rates.
Yet the overall average of the bid rate dispersion (0.012) is only 0.2 basis points higher
than in MROs (0.010), see Nyborg, Bindseil and Strebulaev (2002). Therefore, the
relatively large number of bids submitted in LTROs exaggerates the extent to which
banks distribute their bid amount at diﬀerent interest rates.
Bidding Rates and Opportunistic Bidding
The marginal rate of the LTRO auctions is very close to the corresponding money
market rate, i.e. the 3 month repo valid at the allotment day of the auction, see
Figure 6. The Figure exhibits also the minimum and the maximum of the rates that
were placed by banks in LTROs. The resulting corridor seems to be quite large but in
line with the results obtained for the average bid rate dispersion, its width is mainly
due to a few small bids.
Being not constrained by a minimum bid rate, banks might bid ”opportunistically”,
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The shares are shown for our sample period from March 1999 until May 2003.
i.e. signiﬁcantly below the market consensus to obtain reﬁnancing at very low rates.
This becomes a problem if collusion among bidders leads to distortions in the auction
outcome, which would imply deviations from the competitive outcome. However,
opportunistic bidding has not been an issue in the ECB’s LTROs. There are only
a few cases where banks submit bids at interest rates very much below the market
consensus. Moreover, those bids were negligible in terms of the bid amount indicating
that they stem from small uninformed and not from bidder rings. Needless to say that
these bids were never successful.
3.2 Size and Experience Eﬀects in LTRO Bidding
Size Eﬀects
LTROs are often seen as a convenient longer-term source of reﬁnancing with low ad-
ministrative costs that allows a less active cash management strategy by the banks.
In accordance with the original intentions of the ECB, LTROs should thus be partic-
ularly attractive for small banks. In the present study, we deﬁne a bank’s size with
17
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Number of Share of Never Mean Number Participation Participation
Banks Participating of Bidders Frequency Frequency
Banks in LTRO per LTRO LTRO MRO
Small 737 51.6% 65.42 8.8% 20.8%
Medium 650 34.9% 109.84 16.9% 38.6%
Large 141 16.7% 41.4 29.4% 51.5%
10-largest
banks
10 0% 2.82 28.0% 64.3%
10-largest
bidder
10 0% 6.84 68.4% 70.2%
Notes: Small banks are those with requirement below 10 Mio. Euro. Banks with reserve requirements
ranging from 10 Mio. to 100 Mio. were grouped as medium and banks with reserve requirements above
100 Mio. were classiﬁed as large banks.
respect to its average reserve requirement. Speciﬁcally, 737 banks are called small
because their average reserve requirement is below 10 Mio. Euro. For 650 medium
banks the reserve requirements ranges from 10 Mio. to 100 Mio. Euro and for 141
large banks the reserve requirements exceeds 100 Mio. Euro.4
In line with the ECB’s original intention, LTROs are a relatively more important
reﬁnancing tool for small and medium banks. Figure 7 shows the development of the
LTRO share in total reﬁnancing (LTRO+MRO) over time by size group. On average,
small banks satisfy 35% of their reﬁnancing demand with LTROs while the share is
only 20% for large banks. However, Table 1 shows that the average participation
frequency of small banks is clearly lower in LTROs (8.8%) than in MROs (20.8%).
Moreover, as in MROs, the mean participation in LTROs increases with a bank’s size.
Large banks use LTROs more often (29.4%) than small and medium banks. Table 2
depicting the bid and allotment volumes by size group underlines the impression from
the participation frequencies that LTROs are not used particularly by small banks.5
4 The reserve requirements refer to the period from February 1999 to August 2001. This data was
available for 1528 of the 1809 banks under consideration. All statistics and regressions accounting
for size eﬀects are thus based on the data of these 1528 banks. It is important to note that this
sample reduction does not imply an obvious selection bias. In particular, the banks that dropped
out of the sample included small and large as well as active and inactive bidders coming from all
over the euro area.
5 See also Figure 13 in Appendix for the evolution of allotment shares over time.
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Share in Total Share in Total
Bid Volume Allotment
Small 6.9% 9.3%
Medium 35.6% 46.5%
Large 57.5% 44.2%
10-largest banks 8% 5%
10-largest bidder 25% 23%
Notes: Small banks are those with requirement below 10 Mio.
Euro. Banks with reserve requirements ranging from 10 Mio.
to 100 Mio. were grouped as medium and banks with reserve
requirements above 100 Mio. were classiﬁed as large banks.
For each bank size, the shares in total bids and total allotment diﬀer. Compared to
their bid volume, small banks receive a relatively high share (9.3% vs. 6.9%) of the
total allotment whereas large banks get a small proportion (44.2% vs. 57.5%).6 This
already indicates that the bidding strategies of large banks diﬀer from those of small
banks. Obviously, since large banks receive relatively less repo credit, they must have
bid at lower interest rates.
Table 3 provides more information on the diﬀerent bidding strategies of small, medium
and large banks. The ﬁrst column of Table 3 presents the average spread between the
quantity weighted bid rate and the marginal rate for the various size groups. While
small banks bid on average very close to the marginal rate (−0.006), large banks bid
on average about 2 basis points lower. As a result, large banks tend to receive their
allotment at lower cost. According to the second column of Table 3, the average
interest rate paid on the allotment is two basis points higher for small banks than
for large banks. The higher interest rates paid by small banks are also reﬂected in
the relative reﬁnancing cost (RRC) deﬁned as the ratio of the average interest rate
paid by a bank and the average allotment rate of the auction, see column 3. However,
bidding at lower interest rates comes not without cost. For large banks, the average
6 Note that the diﬀerences in bid and allotment volumes have to be seen in relation to the respective
shares of the size groups in total reserve requirements. The share of small, medium, and large
banks in total reserve requirements is 5%, 25% and 70%, respectively.
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Bid Rate minus Allotment Cover to Bid Cover to Bid Relative
Marginal Rate Rate minus Ratio LTRO Ratio MRO Reﬁnancing
Marginal Rate Costs (RRC)
Small -0.006 0.042 0.50 0.69 1.0023
Medium -0.008 0.028 0.48 0.59 0.9985
Large -0.023 0.020 0.28 0.62 0.9961
10-Largest
banks
-0.028 0.023 0.24 0.60 0.9950
10-Largest
bidder
-0.020 0.020 0.34 0.62 0.9972
Notes: The bid rate and the allotment rate are quantity weighted average rates. Small banks are those
with requirement below 10 Mio. Euro. Banks with reserve requirements ranging from 10 Mio. to 100
Mio. were grouped as medium and banks with reserve requirements above 100 Mio. were classiﬁed as
large banks. The cover to bid ratio for the MROs is calculated on the basis of the variable rate tender
period only.
cover to bid ratio presented in column 4 is much lower than for small and medium
banks. Therefore, bidding at lower interest rates decreases the volume allotted and
increases the risk of going out empty handed. It is not clear which group of banks bids
more ”successful”. While there are marked diﬀerences between small and large banks
in LTROs, in MROs the diﬀerences in the cover to bid ratios across size groups are
by far less distinct, see Table 3. Apparently, bidding strategies in MROs diﬀer from
those applied in LTROs, see column 5 in Table 3. In particular, size eﬀects seems to
be more important for banks’ bidding behavior in LTROs.
Experience Eﬀects
In order to investigate the impact of experience eﬀects on banks’ bidding, we termed
the 26 banks who participated in at least 90% of all LTROs regular bidders.7 With
shares of about 20% in both, total bids and total allotments, this small group of
bidders has a signiﬁcant impact on the auction outcome, see Table 4. Regular bidders
seem to be well informed about the situation in the money market. They bid closer to
the marginal rate than non-regular bidders and receive their allotment approximately
7 Note that there are 5 small, 15 medium and 6 large banks that are considered to be regular bidders.
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Share in Total Share in Total
Bid Volume Allotment
Regular 18% 20%
Non-Regular 82% 80%
EONIA-Banks 32% 22%
Non-EONIA-Banks 68% 78%
Notes: Regular bidders are deﬁned as bidders that participate
in 45 or more of the 50 LTROs. The EONIA panel banks are a
sample of 50 banks that are most active in the money market.
one basis point cheaper, see Table 5. Nevertheless, regular bidders still have a higher
cover to bid ratio than non-regular bidders.
We also looked at the 50 banks that are part of the EONIA panel. Many of the
’EONIA-banks’ are large banks that are very active in the money market. However,
only 5 EONIA-banks belong to the group of regular bidders in LTROs. Table 4 shows
that EONIA-banks come up to 32% of the total bid volume but receive only 22% of the
total allotment. In fact, EONIA-banks bid at lower interest rates than Non-EONIA
banks, see Table 5. However, in contrast to regular bidders they therefore receive only
a small part of their bid. Similar to the results obtained for large banks, the average
cover to bid ratio of EONIA-banks in LTROs is only 27%. The higher average cover
to bid ratio of EONIA-banks in MROs suggests that EONIA-banks adopt a bidding
strategy in LTROs that comes along with a higher risk to go out empty handed.
3.3 Country Diﬀerences in LTRO Bidding Performance
Every credit institution in the euro area, and thus every bidder in the Eurosystem’s
open market operations, can be assigned to a country, namely the one where it is legally
established as a credit institution. If a bidder is established as a credit institution in
e.g. Spain, we will call it a Spanish bank, even in case it would be fully owned by
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Bid Rate minus Allotment Cover to Bid Cover to Bid Relative
Marginal Rate Rate minus Ratio LTRO Ratio MRO Reﬁnancing
Marginal Rate Costs (RRC)
Regular 0.002 0.025 0.51 0.59 0.9980
Non-Regular -0.010 0.033 0.35 0.62 0.9998
EONIA-Banks -0.003 0.019 0.27 0.60 0.996
Non-EONIA-
Banks
-0.008 0.033 0.42 0.63 0.999
Notes: The bid rate and the allotment rate are quantity weighted average rates. Regular bidders are
deﬁned as bidders that participate in 45 or more of the 50 LTROs. The EONIA panel banks are a sample
of 50 banks that are most active in the money market. The cover to bid ratio for the MRO is calculated
on the basis of the variable rate tender period only.
a holding company established in another euro area country.8 T h en u m b e ro fb a n k s
taking part in the ECB’s open market operations diﬀers considerably across countries.
The 1235 German banks form by far the largest group of bidders, see Table 6. The
second largest group are Spanish banks (113) while only 10 banks come from Finland.
However, the average German bank does not participate more often in LTROs than
other countries’ banks. According to Table 6 the average participation frequency of a
German bank is 12.9% which is close to other banks’ participation. The 37 Austrian
banks in our sample participated most frequently in LTROs (29.7%).
Table 6 illustrates that for all countries the average participation frequency in LTROs
is lower than in MROs. Note that the two rankings of the countries according to their
average participation frequency in LTROs and MROs, respectively, look rather similar.
Exceptions are the banks from Belgium and Italy, where, compared to the others, the
average participation frequency is relatively higher in MROs than in LTROs. By
contrast, banks from Portugal and Ireland bid relatively more often in LTROs than
in MROs.
8 Indeed, it is well known that especially in Luxembourg and in Ireland, many credit institutions
have been established by foreign mother companies for the sake of some perceived advantages of
these locations. This issue will not be further pursued here, but it should be kept in mind to not
misinterpret the analysis of the ”country of origin” suggested here.
22
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 359
May 2004Table 6: Banks Participation by Country
Number of Share of Never Mean Number Participation Participation
Banks Participating of Bidders Frequency Frequency
Banks in LTRO per LTRO LTRO MRO
Austria (AT) 37 22% 11.0 29.7% 42.4%
Belgium (BE) 28 43% 2.94 10.5% 30.7%
Finland (FI) 10 50% 1.28 12.8% 24.6%
France (FR) 74 41% 11.04 14.9% 40.8%
Germany (GE) 1235 45% 159.6 12.9% 28.5%
Greece (GR) 12 67% 0.6 5.0% 15.2%
Ireland (IE) 34 29% 5.7 16.8% 28.0%
Italy (IT) 94 33% 10.5 6.3% 30.9%
Luxembourg (LU) 80 54% 11.3 14.1% 29.2%
Netherlands (NE) 54 44% 4.54 8.4% 17.0%
Portugal (PT) 38 28% 5.02 12.9% 14.8%
Spain (ES) 113 57% 8.94 7.8% 21.9%
Table 7 provides an overview on the preference of national banking systems for LTRO
versus MRO reﬁnancing. It displays the share in reﬁnancing of each of the two instru-
ments in the respective country. It should be recalled that on average in the period
1999-2002, the share of LTROs in total reﬁnancing operations is around 26%. One
may ﬁrst distinguish a group of countries for which the share in LTROs is above aver-
age, namely Austria, Germany, Ireland and especially Portugal.9 The relatively high
share of LTROs in Germany, combined with the high share of German banks in total
reﬁnancing, implies a considerable share (56%) of German banks in total LTRO vol-
umes. For Greece and Italy LTROs seem to play a negligible role in banks’ reﬁnancing
with LTRO shares less than 5%.
Table 8 displays that banks who bid at low interest rates have to put up with lower
allotments and thus, smaller cover to bid ratios. A notable exception in this respect
9 The large share in Portugal of over 50% of reﬁnancing has to be seen against the low total reﬁnancing
needs of the Portuguese banking system.
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Total Share in Share in
Reﬁnancing MRO LTRO
(in Mio. Euro)
Austria (AT) 4013 67% 33%
Belgium (BE) 9670 84% 16%
Finland (FI) 1124 75% 25%
France (FR) 17349 83% 17%
Germany (GE) 106822 68% 32%
Greece (GR) 918 99% 1%
Ireland (IE) 8375 39% 61%
Italy (IT) 16375 96% 4%
Luxembourg (LU) 16300 81% 19%
Netherlands (NE) 6940 86% 14%
Portugal (PT) 1765 38% 62%
Spain (ES) 14247 81% 19%
Eurosystem 190183 74% 26%
Notes: The numbers are based on balance sheet data of the national central banks
showing the relative recourse to MRO and LTRO of banks from the particular
country. The total reﬁnancing sum in the second column refers to the average
recourse to open market operations over the sample period from March 1999 to
May 2003.
are the Dutch banks, which have both, a small cover to bid ratio and a high relative
reﬁnancing cost. In the following panel regressions, we will test the signiﬁcance of
country eﬀects for banks’ bidding behavior.
4 Variables and Theoretical Predictions
4.1 What to explain? Variables measuring bidder behavior
For a given size of liquidity needs, each bank has to decide whether to reﬁnance through
a LTRO or through an alternative source of reﬁnancing, like a MRO or the interbank
money market. In Section 5.1, we investigate how a bank’s participation decision
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Bid Rate minus Allotment Cover to Bid Cover to Bid Relative
Marginal Rate Rate minus Ratio LTRO Ratio MRO Reﬁnancing
Marginal Rate Costs (RRC)
Austria (AT) 0.003 0.037 0.32 0.48 1.001
Belgium (BE) -0.023 0.030 0.13 0.67 0.996
Finland (FI) -0.015 0.033 0.22 0.58 0.996
France (FR) -0.029 0.027 0.21 0.52 0.996
Germany (GE) -0.007 0.032 0.43 0.62 1.000
Greece (GR) 0.010 0.033 0.13 0.74 1.003
Ireland (IE) 0.017 0.031 0.68 0.82 1.001
Italy (IT) -0.052 0.019 0.10 0.66 0.989
Luxembourg (LU) -0.011 0.018 0.34 0.66 0.996
Netherlands (NE) 0.008 0.058 0.17 0.46 1.006
Portugal (PT) 0.012 0.048 0.60 0.68 1.002
Spain (ES) -0.016 0.029 0.38 0.75 0.997
Notes: The bid rate and the allotment rate are quantity weighted average rates.
with regard to a LTRO depends on various auction as well as bidder-speciﬁc factors.
In Section 5.2, we estimate the impact of these factors on the quantity of reﬁnancing
demanded by each bank, i.e. the log of the individual bid amount. Furthermore, we
examine the determinants of the price at which banks demand reserves in a LTRO
auction, measured as the quantity weighted average bid rate. In order to account
for changes of the overall interest rate level, the actual variable explained in the
regressions is the spread between the weighted average bid rate and the 3-month
repo rate observed in the money market. Since banks are allowed to bid at up to
ten diﬀerent interest rates, the average bid rate of a bank neither determines the
volume allotted nor the average interest rate to be paid. Understanding banks’ bidding
behavior in LTROs also requires an analysis of the distribution of bids. To that aim,
we examine the factors inﬂuencing the individual bid rate dispersion, deﬁned for
each bank as the quantity weighted standard deviation of its bid rates.
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performance of LTROs. Speciﬁcally, a bidder’s size or its country should not have a
severe impact on the bidding success of a bank. Unfortunately there is no straightfor-
ward way to measure the success of a bank because this would require the knowledge
of a bank’s true demand function which is only partly reﬂected in the bid function
submitted in the auction. For example, suppose a bank left a LTRO empty handed
because it bid only at interest rates below the marginal rate. From the bank’s per-
spective, this auction was no success only if the low bidding rates resulted from a
misperception of the situation in the money market. If, however, the bank bid seri-
ously and the marginal rate of the LTRO simply exceeds the bank’s willingness to pay
then a zero allotment is a ”successful” auction outcome.
In view of these problems we employ two diﬀerent measures of banks’ success. First,
we assume that a banks’ success increases with its individual cover to bid ratio.
This measure captures the plausible idea that banks are the more successful the more
reﬁnancing they receive (relative to their bid). Notice, however, that according to
this measure, bidding at unrealistically high interest rates would be an expensive but
successful strategy. Therefore, as a complementary measure of a bank’s success we
constructed the variable RRC (relative reﬁnancing cost) that relates the average rate
paid by an individual bank to the average allotment rate of the auction. The lower the
relative reﬁnancing cost the more ”successful” is a bank relative to its competitors.
Yet this measure is not without problems either as, for example, RRC may indicate
successful bidding even if a bank received only a disappointingly small part of its bid
volume. Taking the two measures together, one can only be sure that a bidder is more
successful than others if it achieves both, higher average cover to bid ratios and lower
relative reﬁnancing cost.
4.2 And How? Variables explaining bidder behavior
The costs of collateral should be of particular importance for banks’ bidding since
LTRO reﬁnancing blocks collateral and makes it thus unavailable for alternative uses
over a 3-month horizon. Due to data availability there is no exact measure of LTRO
collateral cost. We deﬁne the variable collateral as the spread between the three
month deposit and the three month repo rate valid at the bidding day of the auction,
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Notes: The market rates are quotes from 9:15 AM just prior to the deadline for coun-
terparties’ submission of bids at 9:30 AM. The market rates are displayed from January
1999 onwards.
see Figure 8. This spread measures the opportunity cost of general collateral which
can be used not only in LTROs but also in interbank operations.10 Therefore, an
increase in cost of general collateral could induce banks to increase participation in
LTROs.
In MROs, expectations about future interest rates are a crucial factor for explaining
banks’ bidding behavior. In particular, when banks expect decreasing interest rates,
the pre-announced minimum bid rate leads banks to underbid, i.e. they refrain from
bidding, see ECB(2003a). In order to investigate whether rate change expectations
also aﬀect bidder behavior in LTROs, we deﬁne the variable term spread as the
diﬀerence between the three-month repo rate and the prevailing MRO minimum bid
rate. The 3-month repo rate quotes are taken at 9:15 just prior to the end of the
bidding period for the LTRO at 9:30. Indeed, most bids are submitted in the last
15 minutes of the auction. In accordance with the expectations theory of the term
structure of interest rates, e.g. a negative term spread indicates that interest rates are
10 Collateral useable for central bank operations additionally contains e.g. lower volume issues (Pfand-
briefe) or non-marketable claims, which are not suitable for interbank repos which require stan-
dardization. It should also be noted that we could not account for the fact that availability of
diﬀerent types of collateral varies across countries.
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expected to decline, see e.g. Figure 9.11
The following estimations will also shed light on how interest rate uncertainty af-
fects banks bidding. Regarding the impact of uncertainty, auction theory predicts the
winner’s curse eﬀect which implies that banks bid more cautiously when uncertainty
increases. With increasing uncertainty, banks should mitigate the exposure to win-
ner’s curse by bidding at lower rates, reducing the quantity demanded and increasing
the bid rate dispersion, see Nyborg, Rydqvist and Sundaresan (2002). However, Ny-
borg, Bindseil and Strebulaev (2002) obtain only poor evidence on the winner’s curse
eﬀect in ECB’s MROs. This suggests that banks’ bidding is dominated by other con-
siderations such as the fear of not obtaining any funds, see Scalia and Ordine (2003).
In this case, higher uncertainty induces bidders to submit larger bids at higher rates.
This behavior is also predicted by multi-period reserve management models where
higher interest rate risk increases banks’ demand for reserves, see Nautz (1998). In
the following, interest rate uncertainty is proxied by the variable volatility measured
as the implied volatility derived from options on 3-month EURIBOR futures, see Fig-
11 See also Figure 14 in the Appendix.
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EURIBOR futures. Following ECB (2002a), the implied volatility is a useful measure of
the overall uncertainty associated with future movements in short-term interest rates.
ure 10.12 Following ECB(2002a), the implied volatility is a useful measure of the
overall uncertainty associated with future movements in short-term interest rates.
In order to investigate whether the preannounced LTROs volume inﬂuences the behav-
ior of banks and the outcome of the auction we deﬁned the variable auction size that
equals the LTRO allotment volume. If the central bank increases the intended allot-
ment volume, banks’ might expect the price for liquidity to decrease, thus, increasing
their participation and bid volume accordingly.
Finally, we consider several bidder-speciﬁc regressors. In order to investigate whether
the outcome of the preceding MRO aﬀects the bidding behavior in the following LTRO
we include the change of a bank’s cover to bid ratio (∆CBRMRO) of the previous two
MRO tenders in the regressions. If ∆CBRMRO > 0, then a bank might have received
more MRO repo credit than expected which might aﬀect its bidding behavior in the
upcoming LTRO.13 A further variable that relates LTRO bidding to banks’ behavior
12 Note that volatility is measured at the day when the bidding period ends.
13 ∆CBRMRO is set to zero when a bank did not participate in one of the two previous MROs. Note
that the level CBRMRO is severely distorted by banks’ massive overbidding during the ﬁxed rate
tender period. For that reason, we deﬁned ∆CBRMRO to be zero in the ﬁrst LTRO after the
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bank in the MROs. It should reveal whether e.g. bidders which are especially active
in MROs are less or more active in LTROs.
The variable maturing allotment is deﬁned as the log of a bank’s repo volume
received three months before. If banks use LTROs on a revolving basis, the maturing
amount of the repo credit should increase banks’ participation probability and its bid
volume.
The descriptive data analysis of banks’ bidding in LTROs suggested that bidding
behavior depends on a bank’s size and its experience. In order to test whether these
eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant, we include dummy variables for regular bidders
and for the various size groups (small, medium, large) in the regressions. We will
also investigate the relevance of country eﬀects. A bank’s size or country of origin may
not only inﬂuence the level of an auction variable. Therefore, we will also interact the
size and country dummies with the variables volatility, term spread, and collateral
to investigate how size and country of origin inﬂuences a bank’s reaction to those
variables.
5 A Panel Data Analysis
5.1 The Participation Decision
We analyze the participation decision of an individual bank using a panel version of
the standard probit model. In this model, the dependent variable yit equals one if
bank i participates in auction t ∈{ 1,...,N =5 0 } and is zero otherwise:
Pr(yit =1 |xit)=Φ ( βxit)
where xit denotes the vector of explanatory variables introduced in the previous section
and β the corresponding coeﬃcients. Φ(·) is the standard normal distribution function.
We opted for the random eﬀects probit model since it allows for the inclusion of time-
invariant bidder-speciﬁc regressors.
Table 9 shows the results for the benchmark speciﬁcation of the probit model. In line
ECB’s switch to the variable rate tender format in June 2000.
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Benchmark Size Dependent H0:n o
Probit Model Coeﬃcients size eﬀect
(p-value)
Collateral Costs 0.39 -
(4.76)
Term Spread 0.57 -
(16.25)
Volatility -0.61 -
(-13.93)
Maturing Allotment 0.07 0.07
(55.05) (55.03)
MRO Frequency 2.33 2.33
(22.58) (22.27)
Auction Size 0.77 0.77
(11.92) (15.23)
Regular 1.88 1.88
(14.00) (14.22)
∆CBRMRO -0.25 -0.25
(-6.39) (-6.42)
Sizemedium 0.10 0.32
(1.76) (0.86)
Sizelarge 0.40 2.21
(5.27) (4.15)
Collateralsmall -0 . 2 1
(1.63)
Collateralmedium - 0.42 0.0675
(3.57)
Collaterallarge -0 . 7 9
(3.62)
Term Spreadsmall -0 . 7 4
(12.94)
Term Spreadmedium - 0.45 0.0006
(8.98)
Term Spreadlarge -0 . 5 3
(5.80)
Volatilitysmall - -0.53
(-7.36)
Volatilitymedium - -0.58 0.0018
(-9.24)
Volatilitylarge - -0.98
(-8.67)
Constant -7.84 -8.21
(-16.17) (-15.40)
Notes: The t-values of the parameter estimates are reported in parenthesis. The F-test tests
whether the size-speciﬁc coeﬃcients are equal, i.e. whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
the response to collateral costs, interest expectation and interest rate uncertainty depending
on a bank’ size.
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as interest rate volatility increases. If interest rate volatility is high, banks bid more
reluctantly in LTROs because they fear to bid at interest rates above the uncertain
market consensus. In contrast, Nyborg, Bindseil and Strebulaev (2002) and Scalia
and Ordine (2003) found that interest rate volatility has a positive impact on banks’
participation in ECB’s MROs. The diﬀerent response of banks to rate uncertainty
suggests that the common value component of repo credit received from LTRO is
more pronounced than in MROs.
The signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the variable term spread implies that e.g. banks par-
ticipation decreases if interest rates are expected to fall.14 A strong impact of rate
expectations on banks’ bidding is well documented in MROs where the minimum bid
rate makes bidding less attractive when repo rates are expected to fall. In LTROs,
however, there is no minimum bid rate that prevents bid rates from falling. As a
consequence, there is no obvious explanation for the role of rate expectations for the
bidder behavior in LTROs. In fact, assuming a fairly large term spread of about
50 basis points would lead to a drop in participation by only 3% given the implied
marginal eﬀect of the term spread.
An increase in collateral which indicates higher opportunity cost of general collateral,
increases the probability of participation in an LTRO. Since the ECB’s requirements
for eligible collateral in repo auctions are less restrictive than in the interbank repo
market, an increase in collateral makes participation in LTROs more attractive. Ma-
turing allotment has the expected positive eﬀect on banks’ participation. Thus, as in
MROs, many banks use LTROs on a revolving basis.
The probit model further demonstrates that there are interesting relations between
banks’ bidding behavior in MROs and LTROs. The signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient
of ∆CBRMRO shows that banks tend to participate less (more) when they realized an
unexpectedly high (low) allotment amount in the previous MRO. This suggests that
banks’ demand for reﬁnancing in LTROs depends on the reﬁnancing they received in
current MROs. Moreover, the variable MRO frequency shows that the higher a bank’s
14 We also checked for the possibility that this eﬀect might be asymmetric for interest rate hike and
cut expectations which is not substantiated by the data. Notice further that the peak in the term
spread in October 1999 is not due to rate hike expectations but stems from the Y2K eﬀect. Leaving
out the period until Dec 1999 from our sample does not change our estimates in a signiﬁcant way.
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in LTROs. Thus, LTROs are used frequently by bidders who are also active in MROs.
Medium and large banks use LTROs signiﬁcantly more often than small banks. Thus,
the results from the probit analysis corroborates the impression that LTROs are not
just a monetary policy instrument especially designed for small banks.
5.1.1 Size-speciﬁc Determinants of LTRO Participation
Table 9 also shows the results of an extended probit model where the inﬂuence of
collateral costs, the term spread, and volatility on a bank’s participation are allowed
to dependent on the bank’s size, as measured through its reserve requirement. These
size-eﬀects are implemented by interacting the size-dummies with the variables of
interest. For example, the single variable volatility is replaced by the three size-speciﬁc
variables volatilitysmall, volatilitymedium, and volatilitylarge. The p-values reported in
column 3 of Table 9 correspond to the null-hypothesis that the three size-speciﬁc
coeﬃcients are equal, i.e. that the inﬂuence of a certain variable does not depend on
a bank’s size.
The extended probit model demonstrates that a bank’s size does not only aﬀect the
average level of participation. In fact, size-dependent coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant for
all three variables under consideration. First, small banks do not react signiﬁcantly
to a change in collateral cost, possibly indicating a less active collateral management.
In contrast, if collateral cost in the interbank repo market rise, large banks will try
harder to get funds from the central bank. Second, small banks react more pronounced
to the term spread, i.e. on changes in interest rate expectations. However, even for
small banks there is no evidence that rate cut expectations can lead to bidder strikes
in LTROs. Finally, very much in line with the predictions implied by the winner’s
curse eﬀect, the participation decision of large banks depends stronger on prevailing
interest rate uncertainty. This indicates that large banks tend to be more active in
the money market and are thus more interested in the common value component of
reserves.
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In this section we investigate the impact of a bank’s country of origin on its par-
ticipation decision. We ﬁrst estimate a benchmark probit model which captures
country-speciﬁc diﬀerences in the average level of LTRO participation. In Table 13
(in Appendix), diﬀerences across the 12 EMU countries are measured by 11 country-
dummies and a constant. The model uses Germany as a reference country, such that
the coeﬃcients of the dummy variables show whether the average participation level
in a certain country is higher or lower than in Germany. Interestingly, most of the
country-speciﬁc diﬀerences in the participation frequencies suggested by the descrip-
tive statistics are not statistically signiﬁcant, compare Table 6. Austrian, Finnish and
Portuguese banks, however, participate signiﬁcantly more frequently in LTROs than
banks from Germany. In contrast, the average participation frequency of Spanish
banks is signiﬁcantly lower.
In a second step, we estimate an extended probit model to examine whether banks
from diﬀerent countries behave diﬀerently if market conditions change. Speciﬁcally,
a bank’s response to collateral cost, term spread, and volatility is allowed to depend
on its country of origin. According to Table 14 there are several notable diﬀerences
in the determinants of banks’ participation across countries. For example, Italian
banks react most pronounced towards changes in collateral costs and interest rate
expectations. Moreover, the bid function of Italian banks is more elastic with respect
to interest rate uncertainty than bids from German banks. The general impression is
that the response to changing market conditions is the weaker the larger the country-
speciﬁc share of LTROs in total reﬁnancing, compare Table 7. The diﬀerences across
countries may also help to assess the relevance of restrictions regarding the maturity
match of assets and liabilities.15
15 For example, the strictest liquidity regulations prevail in Germany. The ”Liquidity Principle II” in
the German banking law prescribes that liabilities maturing within one month need to be matched
by as many assets maturing within a months time, whereby diﬀerent weights are given to diﬀerent
sorts of liabilities (e.g. 10% for sight liabilities to non-banks). There are weaker regulation in
Austria, Italy, and the Netherlands, while no binding liquidity restrictions exist in Belgium, Spain,
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Finland. A bank subject to liquidity regulations will probably have
strong preferences for LTROs.
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In this section, we investigate the determinants of a bank’s bid volume, its weighted
average bid rate, and its bid rate dispersion. These variables are left-censored since
they can only be observed if the bank decided to participate in the auction. Regressions
that explain the bidding behavior of a bank have to account for this property of the
data in order to avoid biased estimates. Following Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003)
we apply the two step estimator introduced by Heckman (1976) to account for the
censoring problem.16
Table 10 summarizes the results of the benchmark models for a bank’s bid volume,
the average bid rate, and the bid rate dispersion. As expected, the larger the bank
the higher is its average bid volume.17 While a bank’s size has no inﬂuence on its
bid rate dispersion, the benchmark speciﬁcation for the bid rate conﬁrms that large
banks bid on average 2 basis points lower than smaller banks, compare Table 3. In
contrast to the impression obtained from the descriptive statistics shown in Table
5, the estimation results reveal that bidding experience in LTROs does not play an
important role for banks’ bidding behavior. In fact, the variable regular bidder neither
has a signiﬁcant impact on a bank’s bid rate nor on its bid rate dispersion. Similarly,
very active bidders in MROs (MRO frequency) do not signiﬁcantly bid at lower rates
or on a wider range.
There is a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the results of recent MRO auctions on a bank’s
behavior in LTROs. If the cover to bid ratio has increased in the current MRO
(∆CBRMRO > 0) the bid volume and the bid rate decrease. Apparently, a bank’s
demand for longer term reﬁnancing decreases if its current MRO allotment has in-
creased. If the central bank increase the preannounced allotment volume (auction
size), banks bid higher volumes and at lower rates presumably because they expect
liquidity to be more abundant. Increasing collateral cost in the interbank repo market
16 The ﬁrst step of the Heckman procedure uses the probit participation models estimated in the
previous section to construct inverse Mills ratios. The corresponding inverse Mills ratio is included
into a standard panel GLS regression in the second step. The empirical auction literature typically
ignores the selection bias problem inherent to the bidding data. Exceptions are e.g. Ayuso and
Repullo (2001) and Linzert, Nautz and Breitung (2003) where the bid volume follows a traditional
Tobit model.
17 Recall, however, that a bank’s size is deﬁned with respect to its average reserve requirement and
not with respect to its bid volume.
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Bid Volume Bid Rate Bid Rate
Dispersion
Collateral Costs 0.11 0.64 0.02
(1.76) (81.37) (10.82)
Term Spread 0.26 -0.05 0.007
(8.06) (-11.43) (7.60)
Volatility -0.25 -0.05 -0.004
(-6.43) (-9.78) (-4.20)
Maturing Allotment 0.02 0.001 0.0001
(7.64) (4.33) (1.55)
MRO Frequency 1.18 0.02 0.003
(6.74) (1.36) (1.04)
Auction Size 0.23 -0.07 0.02
(5.22) (-12.34) (19.04)
Regular 0.46 0.02 0.003
(1.99) (1.49) (1.94)
∆CBRMRO -0.15 -0.007 -0.001
(-5.72) (-2.29) (-2.18)
Sizemedium 1.51 0.003 -0.001
(17.66) (0.52) (-1.03)
Sizelarge 3.27 -0.02 -0.001
(25.59) (-1.98) (-1.25)
Constant 13.896 0.78 -0.199
(29.74) (13.87) (-16.47)
Mills Ratio 0.10 0.006 0.001
(2.70) (1.29) (0.84)
Notes: The t-values of the parameter estimates are reported in parenthesis. The inverted Mills ratio
corrects for possible distortions stemming from the censored data problem was calculated from the
previous probit model in Table 9.
appears to drive up the bid rates but does not aﬀect the volume of bids.
The signiﬁcant inﬂuence of volatility on the banks’ bid volume and their average
bid rate conﬁrms the evidence for the winner’s curse eﬀect obtained from the probit
analysis. In line with auction theoretical predictions, banks bid at lower rates and
reduce their bid volume as interest rate uncertainty increases. As mentioned, the
evidence for the winner’s curse eﬀect is much weaker in the ECB’s MROs, see Nyborg,
Bindseil and Strebulaev (2002). However, as in MRO auctions the positive eﬀect of
volatility on the bid rate dispersion somewhat blurs the evidence for the winners curse
eﬀect.
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benchmark models for the determinants of a bank’s bid volume, its bid rate and its
bid rate dispersion results are very much in line with the plausible results obtained
for the participation decision. In particular, each factor that e.g. increases a bank’s
probability of participation in LTROs also increases its bid volume.
5.2.1 Size-speciﬁc Bidding Behavior
This section sheds more light on how a bank’s response to collateral cost, interest rate
expectations and volatility depends on its size. Table 11 presents the extended models
allowing for size speciﬁc coeﬃcients for the bid volume, the bid rate and bid rate
dispersion. Generally, a bank’s size seems to be less important for the bidding variables
than for the participation decision. In particular, the coeﬃcients in the bid volume
equation do not depend on a bank’s size at all. Moreover, the equations estimated
for the bid rate and the bid rate dispersion do not support a size-speciﬁc inﬂuence
of volatility on banks’ bidding. In contrast, the impact of rate expectations is size-
dependent for the bid rate and the bid rate dispersion. In both cases, there is a weaker
response to the term spread of large banks. This constitutes a further interesting
diﬀerence between banks’ bidding behavior in MROs and in LTROs. Breitung and
Nautz (2001) and Scalia and Ordine (2003) found that larger banks react in a more
elastic way to interest rate expectations in the MROs. In MROs, the existence of
a minimum bid rate implies that a strong reaction to rate expectations points to
sophisticated bidding. In LTROs, where no minimum bid rate is set, it is far less
obvious why a bank’s bidding strategy should depend on the term spread.
The inﬂuence of collateral cost on banks’ bid rate and its dispersion is also size-
speciﬁc. Especially large and medium banks spread their bids more when collateral
becomes more expensive in the interbank repo market. In line with results obtained
for banks’ participation decision, this points to a less active collateral management of
small banks.
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Bid H0:n o B i dR a t e H0:n o B i dR a t e H0:n o
Volume Size eﬀect Size eﬀect Dispersion Size eﬀect
Collateral Costs 0.11 - -
(1.76)
Term Spread 0.26 - -
(8.06)
Volatility -0.25 -0.04 -0.004
(-6.43) (-9.49) (-4.22)
Maturing Allotment 0.02 0.0003 0.0001
(7.64) (4.13) (1.76)
MRO Frequency 1.18 0.01 0.003
(6.74) (1.17) (1.19)
Auction Size 0.23 -0.01 0.02
(5.22) (-12.58) (19.08)
Regular 0.46 0.01 0.003
(1.99) (1.49) (1.97)
∆CBRMRO -0.15 -0.007 -0.002
(-5.72) (-2.19) (-2.30)
Sizemedium 1.51 -0.006 -0.003
(17.66) (-0.30) (-3.26)
Sizelarge 3.27 -0.008 -0.002
(25.59) (-0.66) (-1.94)
Collateralsmall 0.10 0.65 0.005
(2.70) (48.99) (1.72)
Collateralmedium - 0.6956 0.66 0.0000 0.025 0.0000
(62.70) (11.05)
Collaterallarge - 0.53 0.022
(31.82) (6.21)
Term Spreadsmall - -0.06 0.009
(-8.86) (6.00)
Term Spreadmedium - 0.059 -0.04 0.0000 0.008 0.0000
(-8.19) (7.05)
Term Spreadlarge - 0.03 0.0001
(-4.48) (0.07)
Volatilitysmall -- -
Volatilitymedium - 0.1549 - 0.6254 -
Volatilitylarge -- -
Constant 13.93 0.79 -0.198
(29.92) (14.12) (-16.47)
Mills Ratio 0.092 0.004 0.0009
(2.59) (1.03) (0.98)
Notes: The t-values of the parameter estimates are reported in parenthesis. The inverted Mills ratio
that corrects for possible distortions stemming from the censored data problem was calculated from
a corresponding probit model. The F-test tests whether the size-speciﬁc coeﬃcients are equal, i.e.
whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the response to collateral costs, interest expectation and
interest rate uncertainty depending on a bank’ size.
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We included country dummies into the benchmark models for the bid volume, bid
rate, and the bid rate dispersion. According to Table 13 (in Appendix), there are
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the average level of LTRO participation depending on a bank’s
country of origin. The results show that, for example, Italian banks bid signiﬁcantly
smaller volumes and at lower rates than banks from the reference country Germany.
Conﬁrming the descriptive statistics (Table 8), Dutch banks bid at higher interest
rates than German banks.
In Tables 15-17 (in Appendix), we extend the benchmark model to size dependent
coeﬃcients for the variables collateral costs, term spread and volatility.I t a p p e a r s
that banks from diﬀerent countries diﬀer in their response to changes in collateral
costs. For example, Belgium and Italian banks cut back on their bid volumes stronger
than, for example, German banks when collateral costs increase. Moreover, while
banks from countries with lower liquidity restrictions, such as Italy, spread their bids
signiﬁcantly more than German and French banks there is no visible diﬀerence in the
reaction of the bid rate when collateral costs increase. When interest expectations
signal rising interest rates, Italian banks spread their bids signiﬁcantly more than
German and French banks.
The results do not provide clear cut evidence that countries with less strict liquidity
regulations bid signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than, for example, German and French banks.
However, it appears that especially the behavior of Italian banks diﬀers from the
behavior of German banks. Italian banks react much stronger on changes in collateral
costs, interest rate expectations and uncertainty than German banks suggesting the
latter to be more dependent on LTROs.
5.3 Bidding Success
In the preceding sections, the analysis of bidder behavior in the ECB’s LTRO auctions
revealed that a bank’s bidding strategy can depend on its size, its country of origin,
and its bidding experience. In this section, we investigate whether the observed bidder
heterogeneity implies that certain types of bidders are systematically more successful
than others. In this case, LTRO auctions may be seen as unfair and the principle of
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simple to ensure an appropriate access to longer term reﬁnancing even for less informed
or less sophisticated bidders. In particular, unexperienced bidders should not be
discouraged in LTROs by disappointing auction outcomes. In the following panel
regressions we therefore investigate whether regular bidders in LTROs or bidders with
a high participation frequency in MROs are signiﬁcantly more successful than others.
Since a bank’s true demand for repo credit is only partly revealed in its bid, measuring
the success of a bank in a LTRO auction is not straightforward. In accordance with
Section 4.1, we proxy the success of a bank’s bidding strategy by two complementary
measures: the individual cover to bid ratio (deﬁned as the ratio between realized
allotment and total bid volume) and the relative reﬁnancing cost (RRC) where the
average interest rate paid by the bank is compared with the average rate paid by all
bidders. The larger the cover to bid ratio and the lower the relative reﬁnancing cost
the more successful is the bank. Of course, a bank can always increase its cover to bid
ratio by bidding at higher interest rates thereby increasing its reﬁnancing cost. As a
consequence, a bank is identiﬁed to be more successful than others only if it achieves
higher average cover to bid ratios [lower RRC] without higher reﬁnancing cost [lower
cover to bid ratios].
The results from the two random eﬀects panel regressions explaining banks’ individual
cover to bid ratios and their relative reﬁnancing cost are presented in Table 12. As
expected, for most regressors the signs of the estimated coeﬃcients are the same in
both equations. In particular, medium and large banks have both, signiﬁcantly lower
reﬁnancing cost as well as lower cover to bid ratios than small banks. As a result,
the diﬀerent bidding strategies of e.g. small and large banks are hard to evaluate in
terms of success. Small banks prefer a secure allotment by realizing higher cover to
bid ratios, while large banks are more ﬂexible with respect to the allotment volume
caring more about their reﬁnancing cost. This bidding behavior can also be observed
for banks participating very frequently in MROs (MRO frequency). In contrast to
the preliminary evidence suggested by the descriptive statistics presented in Table 5,
the panel regressions reveal that there is only weak evidence in favor of an experience
eﬀect on the auction outcome. The regular bidders dummy neither has a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on the cover to bid ratio nor on a bank’s relative reﬁnancing cost.
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(RRC)
Cover to Bid RRC
Ratio
Collateral Costs 0.05 -0.001
(1.30) (-1.20)
Term Spread -0.20 -0.002
(-12.20) (-4.14)
Volatility 0.22 0.0003
(11.18) (0.59)
Maturing Allotment 0.01 0.0001
(18.05) (4.90)
MRO Frequency -0.15 -0.004
(-4.78) (-3.24)
Auction Size 0.15 0.001
(6.58) (1.92)
Regular 0.05 -0.0005
(1.43) (-0.29)
∆CBRMRO 0.006 -0.0001
(0.42) (-0.11)
Sizemedium -0.053 -0.003
(-3.12) (-3.98)
Sizelarge -0.15 -0.003
(-5.77) (-2.88)
AT 0.03 0.001
(0.71) (0.88)
BE -0.20 -0.001
(-3.01) (-0.23)
ES -0.05 -0.003
(-1.31) (-1.60)
FI -0.17 -0.001
(-1.89) (-0.34)
FR -0.08 -0.003
(-1.94) (-1.66)
GR -0.35 -0.008
(-2.21) (-0.77)
IE 0.19 0.003
(3.10) (1.26)
IT -0.24 -0.01
(-7.58) (-8.68)
LU -0.02 -0.002
(-0.70) (-1.51)
NE 0.03 0.006
(0.60) (2.84)
PT 0.12 0.002
(1.41) (0.53)
Constant -1.84 0.99
(-8.36) (161.79)
Notes: The t-values of the parameter estimates are reported in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance on the 5%
level is indicated by bold numbers. Germany is taken as the base country so the respective dummy is
omitted.
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the auction outcome depends on a bank’s country of origin. Taking Germany as
the reference country, we found that relative reﬁnancing cost for Italian banks are
on average about one basis point lower. However, Italian banks cannot be seen to be
more successful than their German counterparts because they also realize signiﬁcantly
smaller cover to bid ratios. Apparently, Italian banks have diﬀerent preferences re-
garding their means of reﬁnancing and hence pursue diﬀerent bidding strategies. This
is also reﬂected in the diﬀerent country shares in reﬁnancing in LTROs, see Table 7.
There are three countries where banks appear to bid less successful than those from
Germany. Banks from Belgium and Greece realize signiﬁcantly lower cover to bid
ratios but their reﬁnancing cost are not signiﬁcantly lower. Banks from Netherland
pay a higher interest rate without receiving a higher allotment. By contrast, bidders
from Ireland seem to bid particularly successful in LTRO auctions. While their relative
reﬁnancing cost is not signiﬁcantly higher than those from German bidders, Irish banks
nevertheless achieve a signiﬁcantly higher cover to bid ratio. Although there are thus
some statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in success, the economic signiﬁcance of the
diﬀerences appears marginal.
6 Concluding Remarks
In the Eurosystem, on average over the ﬁrst ﬁve years, around 55 bln Euro, i.e. about
25% of banks’ total repo credit was provided through longer term reﬁnancing oper-
ations (LTROs). The role of LTROs in the ECB’s operational framework is thus far
from negligible. Yet, the empirical performance of LTRO auctions, i.e. banks’ bidding
behavior and the determinants of the auction outcomes have not been well researched
so far. On the one hand, it has been argued that LTROs should be suspended since
they would unnecessarily complicate monetary policy implementation. On the other
hand, one could take the view that the volume of LTROs could even be increased if
that would improve the eﬃciency of banks’ reserve management without introducing
market distortions. This paper analyzed the individual bidding data of the LTRO
auctions performed until May 2003 in order to shed light on these issues.
One of the original intentions of the ECBwhen establishing LTROs was to give smaller
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term reﬁnancing, see ECB(2002b). Certainly, in terms of their total reﬁnancing
volume, LTROs are more important for smaller and medium size banks than for large
banks. However, our results do not substantiate the notion that LTROs are especially
designed for and used by smaller banks. In particular, the results from a panel probit
model reveal that a bank’s participation probability in a LTRO increases with its size.
Our results demonstrate that a bank’s size does not only aﬀect the average level of
participation. In fact, size-dependent coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant for all three variables
under consideration. First, small banks do not react signiﬁcantly to a change in
collateral cost, possibly indicating a less active collateral management. In contrast,
if collateral cost in the interbank repo market rise, large banks will try harder to get
funds from the central bank. Second, small banks react more pronounced to the term
spread, i.e. on changes in interest rate expectations. This seems to indicate that small
banks are less sophisticated in their cash management as interest rate expectations
should not be important in a pure variable rate tender. However, even for small banks
there is no evidence that rate cut expectations can lead to bidder strikes in LTROs.
We found that a bank’s average participation in LTROs increases with its participation
frequency in the ECB’s main reﬁnancing operations (MROs). Thus, banks’ use of
LTROs and MROs cannot be seen as independent. Many banks use both reﬁnancing
instruments to diversify the maturity of their liabilities. Moreover, a surprisingly low
allotment in a recent MRO, increases both, a bank’s participation probability and its
bid volume in the subsequent LTRO.
An important requirement for a smooth functioning of LTROs is that the auction
procedure does not violate the principle of equal treatment. In particular, certain
types of banks should not bid a priori more successful in LTROs than others. Although
we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the bidding behavior across banks of diﬀerent size
and from diﬀerent countries, the resulting diﬀerences in terms of bidding success were
astonishingly small. In addition, the analysis of banks’ cover to bid ratio and their
relative reﬁnancing cost showed that diﬀerent bidding strategies in most cases do not
imply an obvious ranking of banks in terms of bidding success. For example, small
banks bid on average two basis points higher than large banks. One the one hand this
implies that small banks realize higher cover to bid ratios in LTROs. On the other
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While the preannounced minimum bid rate is an important feature of the ECB’s
MROs, LTROs are conducted as pure variable rate tenders. One might expect that
without the guidance of a minimum bid rate, bidding in LTRO auctions would be par-
ticularly diﬃcult. In fact, in contrast to MROs where most banks place their whole
bid volume at a single interest rate, banks typically submit several bids in LTROs.
Yet, the weighted standard deviation of bid rates in LTROs is only one basis point
which is very close to the bid rate dispersion observed in MROs. Moreover, there is
no indication that a pure variable rate tender induces bidders to act ”opportunisti-
cally” by bidding on a large scale deliberately below the market consensus. We also
found that experienced bidders are not signiﬁcantly more successful in LTROs than
less experienced ones. Apparently, the LTRO auctions are suﬃciently simple and
transparent even without a minimum bid rate.
The analysis of banks’ bidding behavior provided strong evidence for the winner’s
curse eﬀect in LTROs. In line with the theoretical predictions, banks reduce their
participation, bid at lower interest rates, and reduce their bid volume as interest rate
uncertainty increases. Interestingly, large banks react stronger to rate uncertainty
than small banks. This indicates that large banks are particulary interested in the
common value component of the longer term reﬁnancing since they have on average
a more active interbank money market desk. The ﬁnding of a winner’s curse eﬀect in
LTROs is in marked contrast to the absence of a winner’s curse eﬀect in the ECB’s
main reﬁnancing operations, see e.g. Nyborg, Bindseil and Strebulaev (2002). In
contrast to MROs, which can be seen as the ”last resort” of open market operations,
a failure to get funds in LTROs can still be compensated by bidding more aggressively
in MROs. This suggests that the private value component is more pronounced in
MROs than in LTROs.
In sum, this study demonstrated that the longer term repo auctions of the European
Central Bank do neither lead to market distortions nor to unfair auction outcomes.
This may explain why banks nearly unanimously opposed in fall 2002 the idea, raised
by the ECBin a public consultation, to suspend this type of open market operations.
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LTROs are normally allotted on the Wednesday during the ﬁrst week of each reserve
maintenance period (i.e. between the 23 and the end of the month).18 Banks submit
bids from 15:30 on Tuesday to 9:30 on Wednesday. The allotment result is published on
Thursday at 11:20.The operation is settled one day after the allotment. The operations
mature on the settlement days of the operations being conducted three months later,
such that at any moment in time, exactly three operations are outstanding in the
market.
Figure 11:
Notes: This Figure was taken from ECB (2000) and shows the speciﬁc timing of ECB’s
LTROs.
18 Starting in April 2004, LTROs will be conducted at the last Wednesday of each month.
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Figure 12: The Number of Bidders in ECB’s LTROs by Size Group
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Notes: The number of bidders shown in the Figure refers to LTROs conducted from
March 1999 until May 2003.
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large in total LTRO allotment. The shares are displayed over the sample period from
March 1999 until May 2003.
Figure 14: Marginal LTRO Rate and Minimum Bid Rate from MRO
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Probit Model Bid Volume Bid Rate Bid Rate
Dispersion
Collateral Costs 0.38 0.11 0.64 0.02
(4.75) (1.65) (81.60) (10.90)
Term Spread 0.57 0.26 -0.04 0.007
(16.22) (7.91) (-11.31) (7.63)
Volatility -0.61 -0.24 -0.05 -0.004
(-13.93) (-6.24) (-9.89) (-4.31)
Maturing Allotment 0.07 0.02 0.001 0.0001
(55.66) (7.39) (4.32) (1.54)
MRO Frequency 2.23 1.21 0.02 0.002
(24.13) (6.90) (1.40) (0.83)
Auction Size 0.77 0.23 -0.07 0.02
(15.24) (5.09) (-12.29) (19.10)
Regular 1.86 0.59 0.02 0.003
(13.90) (2.58) (1.46) (1.69)
∆CBRMRO -0.26 -0.14 -0.007 -0.001
(-6.60) (-5.68) (-2.27) (-2.14)
Sizemedium 0.23 1.41 0.005 -0.004
(4.16) (15.96) (0.95) (-0.44)
Sizelarge 0.50 2.93 -0.007 -0.002
(6.43) (20.29) (-0.81) (-0.16)
AT 0.35 0.13 0.02 0.003
(4.29) (0.59) (1.46) (1.71)
BE -0.04 0.86 -0.01 -0.007
(-0.43) (2.62) (-0.58) (-2.29)
ES -0.40 0.19 -0.04 -0.004
(-5.06) (1.08) (-3.14) (-2.29)
FI 0.52 0.88 0.007 0.002
(4.17) (1.77) (0.24) (0.54)
FR -0.11 0.72 -0.02 0.001
(-1.33) (3.42) (-1.24) (0.30)
GR -0.34 0.21 -0.02 -0.001
(-1.03) (0.32) (-0.48) (-0.08)
IE -0.42 0.92 0.02 0.002
(-) (2.64) (1.38) (0.56)
IT 0.08 0.36 -0.04 -0.001
(1.07) (2.22) (-4.31) (-0.32)
LU -0.38 0.80 0.01 -0.002
(-) (4.22) (0.50) (-1.50)
NE -0.05 0.46 0.03 -0.003
(-0.37) (1.87) (2.20) (-1.54)
PT 0.36 0.61 0.04 -0.002
(3.18) (1.65) (1.70) (-0.46)
Constant -7.83 13.88 0.77 -0.19
(-16.15) (29.68) (13.82) (-16.47)
Mills Ratio - 0.09 0.01 0.001
(2.45) (1.36) (0.83)
Notes: The t-values of the parameter estimates are reported in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance on the 5%
level is indicated by bold numbers. Germany is taken as the base country so the respective dummy
is omitted. The inverted Mills ratio that corrects for possible distortions stemming from the censored
data problem was calculated from a corresponding probit model.
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Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
Collateral Volatility Maturing Allotment 0.07
(54.77)
AT 0.12 AT -0.498 MRO Frequency 2.36
(0.28) (-2.10) (25.58)
BE1 . 0 4 BE -1.04 Auction Size 0.77
(1.50) (-2.95) (15.08)
GE 0.005 GE -1.10 Regular 1.88
0.05 -1.10 (16.11)
ES 1.73 ES -1.10 ∆CBRMRO -0.26
(4.78) (-5.73) (-6.63)
FI 1.42 FI -0.94
(1.30) (-1.90)
FR 1.29 FR -0.90 Sizemedium 0.16
(3.19) (-4.17) (2.84)
GR 4.72 GR -1.78 Sizelarge 0.30
(0.64) (-1.06) (3.70)
IE 0.96 IE -0.24
(1.24) (-0.57)
IT 2.68 IT -1.22
(8.07) (-6.85)
LU 0.25 LU -1.07
(0.64) (-5.31)
NE 0.83 NE -0.54
(1.55) (-1.94)
PT 0.14 PT -1.88
(0.10) (-4.68)
p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000
Term Spread Constant -8.32
(-16.64)
AT 1.31 AT 0.46
(6.92) (0.48)
BE 1.05 BE1 . 6 7
(3.44) (1.19)
GE 0.49
(11.68)
ES 0.96 ES 1.94
(5.83) (2.47)
FI -0.72 FI 1.71
(-1.62) (0.87)
FR 0.81 FR 1.27
(4.57) (1.44)
GR -0.95 GR 4.48
(-0.63) (0.67)
IE 0.397 IE -0.93
(1.20) (-0.56)
IT 1.42 IT 2.77
(9.35) (3.80)
LU 0.24 LU 2.28
(1.51) (2.77)
NE 0.44 NE 0.07
(1.86) (0.06)
PT -2.19 PT 6.13
(-4.00) (3.85)
p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000
Notes: The t-values of the parameter estimates are reported in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance on the 5% level is
indicated by bold numbers. Germany is taken as the base country so the respective dummy is omitted. The
reported p-value is computed from an F-test that tests whether the country-speciﬁc coeﬃcients are equal, i.e.
whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the response to collateral costs, interest expectation and interest
rate uncertainty depending on a bank’s country of origin.
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Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
Collateral Volatility Maturing Allotment 0.02
(7.94)
AT -0.40 AT -0.02 MRO Frequency 1.26
(-1.54) (-0.15) (7.14)
BE 1.22 BE -1.15 Auction Size 0.24
(1.98) (-3.58) (5.26)
GE -0.01 GE -0.22
(-0.16) (-5.29)
ES 0.21 ES -0.31 Regular 0.595
(0.72) (-1.91) (2.64)
FI -1.55 FI 0.49 ∆CBRMRO -0.15
(-1.53) (1.14) (-5.81)
FR 1.04 FR -0.71 Sizemedium 1.41
(3.35) (-4.13) (16.08)
GR 7.74 GR 0.14 Sizelarge 2.91
(0.54)) (0.04) (20.40)
IE 0.34 IE -0.20 Mills Ratio 0.11
(0.71) (-0.70) (2.95)
IT 1.38 IT -0.57
(5.31) (-3.89)
LU -0.26 LU -0.16
(-0.87) (-1.22)
NE 0.63 NE -0.29
(1.40) (-0.98)
PT -3.71 PT 0.63
(-0.99) (1.26)
p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000
Term Spread Constant 13.70
(28.46)
AT 0.38 AT -0.64
(3.13) (-0.95)
BE 1.24 BE 4.18
(4.47) (3.23)
GE 0.26
(7.39)
ES 0.25 ES 0.53
(1.78) (0.80)
FI -0.85 FI -1.77
(-2.23) (-1.03)
FR 0.42 FR 2.49
(2.87) (3.53)
GR 0.029 GR -2.02
(0.01) (-0.15)
IE 0.31 IE 0.85
(1.40) (0.69)
IT 0.26 IT 1.54
(1.83) (2.61)
LU -0.007 LU 0.64
(-0.05) (1.13)
NE 0.48 NE 0.61
(2.30) (0.51)
PT -1.04 PT -2.26
(-1.68) (-1.28)
p-value 0.000 p-value 0.000
Notes: The t-values of the parameter estimates are reported in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance on the 5% level is
indicated by bold numbers. Germany is taken as the base country so the respective dummy is omitted. The
reported p-value is computed from an F-test that tests whether the country-speciﬁc coeﬃcients are equal, i.e.
whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the response to collateral costs, interest expectation and interest
rate uncertainty depending on a bank’s country of origin.
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Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
Collateral Volatility -0.04 Maturing Allotment 0.001
(-10.07) (8.49)
AT 0.78 AT - MRO Frequency 0.007
(27.18) (0.71)
BE 0.62 BE- Auction Size -0.07
(9.91) (-14.55)
GE 0.65 GE -
(71.45)
ES 0.56 ES - Regular 0.01
(18.93) (0.93)
FI 0.58 FI - ∆CBRMRO -0.006
(5.53) (-1.88)
FR 0.51 FR - Sizemedium 0.003
(15.52) (0.64)
GR 0.23 GR - Sizelarge -0.01
(0.41) (-1.40)
IE 0.88 IE -
(17.06)
IT 0.39 IT -
(15.26)
LU 0.63 LU -
(19.24)
NE 0.77 NE -
(16.16)
PT 1.09 PT -
(4.84)
p-value 0.015 p-value 0.167
Term Spread Constant 0.796
(17.43)
AT 0.02 AT -
(1.17)
BE -0.04 BE-
(-1.38)
GE -0.49
(-12.55)
ES -0.05 ES -
(-3.28)
FI 0.08 FI -
(1.75)
FR -0.10 FR -
(-5.91)
GR -0.30 GR -
(-0.70)
IE 0.01 IE -
(0.29)
IT -0.08 IT -
(-5.22)
LU -0.03 LU -
(-2.35)
NE -0.01 NE -
(-0.50)
PT 0.04 PT -
(0.58)
p-value 0.000 p-value 0.299
Notes: The t-values of the parameter estimates are reported in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance on the 5% level is
indicated by bold numbers. Germany is taken as the base country so the respective dummy is omitted. The
reported p-value is computed from an F-test that tests whether the country-speciﬁc coeﬃcients are equal, i.e.
whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the response to collateral costs, interest expectation and interest
rate uncertainty depending on a bank’s country of origin.
53
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 359
May 2004Table 17: Bid Rate Dispersion Regression with Country Speciﬁc Coeﬃcients
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
Collateral Volatility -0.004 Maturing Allotment 0.00005
(-4.59) (2.39)
AT 0.016 AT - MRO Frequency 0.0006
(2.68) (0.44)
BE -0.021 BE- Auction Size 0.022
(-1.64) (21.20)
GE 0.02 GE -
(9.10)
ES 0.009 ES - Regular 0.003
(1.44) (1.92)
FI 0.061 FI - ∆CBRMRO -0.001
(2.96) (-2.12)
FR 0.019 FR - Sizemedium -0.0008
(2.83) (-1.13)
GR 0.023 GR - Sizelarge -0.0016
(0.23) (-1.51)
IE 0.027 IE -
(2.50)
IT 0.029 IT -
(5.54)
LU 0.018 LU -
(2.72)
NE 0.016 NE -
(1.63)
PT 0.002 PT -
(0.05)
p-value 0.000 p-value 0.682
Term Spread Constant -0.192
(-19.33)
AT 0.003 AT -
(0.89)
BE 0.005 BE-
(0.72)
GE 0.006
(7.06)
ES 0.004 ES -
(1.18)
FI -0.019 FI -
(-1.88)
FR 0.014 FR -
(3.82)
GR 0.006 GR -
(0.08)
IE -0.001 IE -
(-0.18)
IT 0.019 IT -
(5.66)
LU 0.004 LU -
(1.26)
NE -0.003 NE -
(-0.62)
PT -0.019 PT -
(-1.14)
p-value 0.000 p-value 0.569
Notes: The t-values of the parameter estimates are reported in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance on the 5% level is
indicated by bold numbers. Germany is taken as the base country so the respective dummy is omitted. The
reported p-value is computed from an F-test that tests whether the country-speciﬁc coeﬃcients are equal, i.e.
whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the response to collateral costs, interest expectation and interest
rate uncertainty depending on a bank’s country of origin.
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